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Abstract
In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) decision-making
and autonomous systems became an integrated part of the
economy, industry, and society. The evolving economy of the
human-AI ecosystem raising concerns regarding the risks and
values inherited in AI systems. This paper investigates the dy-
namics of creation and exchange of values and points out gaps
in perception of cost-value, knowledge, space and time di-
mensions. It shows aspects of value bias in human perception
of achievements and costs that encoded in AI systems. It also
proposes rethinking hard goals definitions and cost-optimal
problem-solving principles in the lens of effectiveness and
efficiency in the development of trusted machines. The paper
suggests a value-driven with cost awareness strategy and prin-
ciples for problem-solving and planning of effective research
progress to address real-world problems that involve diverse
forms of achievements, investments, and survival scenarios.
Introduction
Problem-solving and planning are decision-making pro-
cesses that consist of ordered decision choices and deci-
sion actions (Kriger and Barnes 1992; Marwala 2015). In-
stantaneous decision-choices are the atomic units that com-
pose a decision-action. Decision-theoretic planning is an ap-
proach (Boutilier, Dean, and Hanks 1999) for solving se-
quential decision problems that result with a plan or a pol-
icy. Under the assumption of a deterministic environment,
a course of actions is a plan that guarantees to reach a spe-
cific goal. A more flexible framework for a solution plan
or policies is a course of action with an expected high util-
ity that fits uncertainty scenarios and a more complex tar-
get structures and reward dynamics represented in prefer-
ences value or utility functions. An optimized decision re-
sults in a global maximization of utility (DeGroot 2005;
Berger 2013). Decision actions can be rational or irrational.
Followed by (Marwala 2015) we define the decision action
as rational if it results in a global optimum, based on logical
principles and derived from complete relevant information.
A decision that based on irrelevant or incomplete informa-
tion is irrational, and cannot guarantee guidance for a global
optimum. Rational decision-making process comprises ra-
tional decision actions, and the entire process optimized in
time and results in a global utility optimum (Gru¨ne-Yanoff
2012; Marwala 2014; Marwala 2015)
If so, rational decisions made only in a deterministic, per-
fect world with complete information. However, real-world
scenarios are more complicated. It is not always possible to
analyze all available and relevant information to evaluate all
options required for making a responsible decision. For in-
stance, planning domains with uncertainty, by default solved
with an irrational decision-making process due to limited
relevant information. Consider the deterministic oversub-
scription planning (OSP) (Smith 2004; Van Den Briel et al.
2004; Do and Kambhampati 2004; Van Den Briel, Sanchez,
and Kambhampati 2004; Nigenda and Kambhampati 2005;
Benton 2006; Aghighi and Jonsson 2014; Do et al. 2007;
Domshlak and Mirkis 2015; Muller and Karpas 2018), deal-
ing with domains in which there is over-subscription of
possible achievements to limited resources. This problem
is computationally challenging, scaling to real-world com-
plexity with multi-valued arbitrary utility functions over
achievements, numerical utility values are challenging even
in small domains, due to limited processing capability for
inference and utilization of relevant information. Aghighi
and Jonsson (2014) provided a detailed complexity analysis
on the OSP problem. Despite the theoretically determinis-
tic definition of the problem, limited computational capa-
bilities do not allow us to enjoy determinism. This concept
termed bounded rationality (Simon 1957; Simon 1990;
Simon 1991) and explains irrational decision making based
on incomplete data analysis. (Marwala 2013) Extended this
term to flexible-bounded rationality, based on the concept
that The advance of AI and machine data analysis makes the
bounds of rationality flexible. The imperfection of informa-
tion can be partially corrected by using advanced informa-
tion analysis methods.
An important observation of (Marwala 2013) is that ra-
tionality is not dividable, even one irrational action makes
the entire process irrational, which makes guarantees for
optimality to irrational. A process of applying a sequence
of depended actions cannot be partly rational and partly ir-
rational. An imperfection of relevant information, leads to
an entire decision process irrationality with a sub-optimal
end, in time or utility. Scaling up to over-subscription plan-
ning with a multi-valued general utility function, we have
to be concerned with the challenge of an exponential blow-
up even in small tasks. We base our approach on (Marwala
2013) observation that the abundance of information with
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limited processing capability results in the incompleteness
of effective information for a rational decision.
Data Infor-mation
Knowledge Wisdom
Figure 1: DIKW hierarchy.
The relation of information and knowledge modeled in
the in DIKW hierarchy (data - information - knowledge -
wisdom) as illustrated in Figure 1. Some researches agree
that the origins of DIKW are in T.S. Eliot’s poem The
Rock (1934). Years later, the DIKW hierarchy got atten-
tion in the literature of research (Zeleny 1987; Cooley 1980;
Ackoff 1989). An in-deep survey by Rowley (2007) shows
several observations and extensions to the basic model. Ack-
off (1989) made an example in practice to the theory by pro-
viding a refined, one-page paper explanation to the relations
between the DIKW hierarchy component and analysis of the
effectiveness and efficiency aspects in a process to obtain
knowledge and wisdom from data. The key concepts are as
follows.
• Data are symbols that represent the properties of objects
and events.
• Information is processed data directed at increasing its
usefulness (utility), compactly described data.
• Knowledge is the instructions on how to use information.
– Understanding is an explanation why.
– Intelligence is the ability to increase efficiency, not ef-
fectiveness. Information, knowledge, and understand-
ing constitute Intelligence.
• Wisdom is the ability to increase effectiveness, to add
value, which requires judgment function. Effectiveness is
an evaluated efficiency.
In an imperfect world, we should be aware of the extent
to which we allow missing information and its relevance for
the decision process and the process of turning knowledge
into action. Judgment function which evaluates effectiveness
purely leads to making unconscious mistakes or crimes by
turning information into action.
In the literature of organizational management KHiA
“know-how-in-action” (Swart 2011; Strati 2007; Cunliffe
2008; Empson 2001) is a model of turning knowledge into
action. Effective action depends on an effective judgment
function must be based on knowledge. The effectiveness of
actions varies with the context which depends on the spe-
cific people, the place and the time in which applied. Knowl-
edge as a static resource, which creates value within a con-
text and through actions, at a place in time (Swart 2011;
Spender 1996). In what follows we define rationality as the
judgment function of evaluating efficiency.
Values Utilities and Trust
Value is a state-related term quantifies some existence like
goods, aggregated beliefs of society like money. Ethical val-
ues are the aggregated conception of an interrelated society
regarding principles or norms. Future value is the potential
of the mentioned above, an expected wealth. Values are not
obsolete for few reasons; First society constructed from in-
dividuals, aggregated value of individuals is relatively fair
since each weighted differently in aggregation. For exam-
ple, the value of money and the derived pricing of goods
is a function of the amount of its existence and availabil-
ity. Since individuals posse different amount of money, they
represented in the evaluation differently.
While the amount of money or price is obsolete, each
evaluates it differently, from its perspective. Theory of labor
states that people subjective to value relative to the troubles
they have to suffer to achieve it. The literature addresses the
concept of subjective evaluation with the utility term. In this
paper, we express in the utility the usefulness of an action or
process to create value. Useful action or process will make
a net positive impact on total value and not useful will make
a negative impact on the value. We distinguish between two
types of utility.
1. Individual, subjective value of a productive process.
2. Social, aggregated value of the productive process.
The first type of utility will be called merely utility to fit the
traditional terms that explain this phenomenon. The litera-
ture treats mainly to the outcome of an action as the utility.
The term marginal utility covered the change and defined as
an added benefit with the increase of one unit of product.
The definition of marginal utility is good enough to evaluate
the local progress of a process, on the level of a single action
and to observe the usefulness.
While this is enough to model some economic aspects,
it does not model the real-world complexity of the change
of value dynamics. Real economy involves more complex
scenarios that cannot be measured marginally local. For ex-
ample, an investment can take many forms and strategies
and involve multidimensional value dynamics; time, place,
emotional effort, investigation effort and more. The nature
of investments is that they made with a future perspective,
i.e., make a significant effort under limited resources for a
greater good, and it should be planned responsibly. Due to
time and uncertainty dynamics of investments, a trusted sys-
tem and society becomes a significant issue. Without a sys-
tem trust long-term projects cannot be done, and with short
and efficient self-concentrated project it is only a matter of
time that a system will come apart. The human-AI ecosys-
tem that constitutes of individuals and groups of individuals
and there slaved machines. Individuals that take individual,
local in place and time perspective, will act cost-optimally,
neglecting long-term implications. Cost optimality is dan-
gerous when performed by people or bounded rational ma-
chines since optimality in cost is frequently achieved at the
expense of values, both of the cost-optimal agent and other
agents with which it interacts. If we can not promise com-
plete rationality in our machines, the cost-optimal strategy
must be re-examined for the sake of values that out of the
boundaries of the perception of irrational machines.
Here we concentrate on two kinds of economic errors that
are critical to any system that plans for trust. From an eco-
nomic perspective, an autonomous agent or human agents
Dimensions of Value Dimensions of Costs
Ethical Value principles and norms of a society Ethical Costs reputation, trade of values, war, be-
trays, crime
Financial Value currency, coins Financial cost currency, coins
Knowledge KHiA “know-how-in-action”, cre-
ation, productivity
Knowledge
potential
unrealized potential, obtained and
shared (e.g. social good), obtained
but not enrolled to value (e.g.
stolen, lost)
Labor value potential of value creation (not only
financial, can be enrolled to any
value)
Labor cost usually evaluated with money, but
includes many human related issues
like motivations and effort, time and
more
Emotional Value can be enrolled in to motivation for
example and through that to cre-
ation of any value
Emotional cost implies decrease in motivation, low
productivity
Symbolic Value articles, desire, places, traditions,
associated with memories and be-
liefs (related to past and future)
Symbolic cost losing hope, unstable connection to
society, individualism
The value of
time
can be invested as a cost of a new
productive process acceleration of
productive process, travel, surfing,
opportunity to have benefit of a
product, creativity, social bonding
The cost of time all what could happen but did not,
unmaintained values, can be en-
rolled into decrease of each of the
above mentioned values
... ...
Table 1: Dimensions of costs and values
are untrustable if they apply the following value-errors.
• An error in perception and awareness of self-actions con-
tradicting the principles of the environment in which he
acts with the impact the global system and its individuals
values.
• The agent is trustable if he will not commit crimes of val-
ues, i.e., exploiting system and value gaps for arbitrage.
In what follows we will show several dimensions of value
and analyze inter-dimensional gaps or traps.
Hidden Dimensions of Costs and Values
Recent studies showed interest in a non-monetary evalua-
tion of goods and activities (Poladian et al. 2003; Garri-
son, Mestre-Ferrandiz, and Zamora 2016) presenting a more
complex and realistic scheme of values. The dimensions of
value and cost are defined by a society or organization and
cannot be measured in the traditional monetary terms. The
non-monetary dimensions of value are separated and mea-
sured on different scales. The dynamic between dimensions
creates value from values, for example, the value of knowl-
edge can be created by paying the cost in all the values as
mentioned in Table1, which are enrolled into knowledge,
unlike the traditional financial value and cost which paid
and gained in the same monetary terms. When a discussion
takes place on ethics and fairness, the dimensions must be
separated and cannot be treated with different terms or sub-
jectively as the utility term which is discussed in the next
section.
The Diamond-Water Paradox
The utility is a subjective evaluation from an individual per-
spective of the wealth that he gains from a specific value.
The paradox of value (and utility) as presented by (Smith
1776);
The things which have the greatest value in use
have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on
the contrary, those who have the greatest value in ex-
change have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing
is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce
anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for
it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in
use; but a very great quantity of other goods may fre-
quently be had in exchange for it.
The labor theory (Farber, Costanza, and Wilson 2002) of
value solve this paradox by explaining the cost of everything
that one wants with the relative difficulty to fulfill the want,
and the difficulties can be different as Figure 2 shows. Note,
autonomous, AI and information systems produce some util-
ity types that listed in Table 2. For example, the development
of the internet combined with the development of the mobile
phone created through the form utility, utilities of different
types. Mobile phone with Internet connection solves many
issues of things we want in place and time. At the same time,
the same phone is the reason that working days continue af-
ter working hours, this is the duality of availability.
Value Bias and Lost Utility
Dimensions of values and different types of utility, subjec-
tiveness toward values and bounded rationality create gaps
in perception of exchange and creation of values. Gaps cre-
ate risks errors and opportunities, which depend on the ob-
server and the subject of the gap. A good ethical behavior
that expected from individuals from the perspective of the
society is bridging gaps. Bridging gaps and avoid arbitrage
by individuals creates value-driven progress and to avoid ar-
bitrage. Bad behavior for the society is exploitation of gaps
by individuals to make a self-concentrated arbitrage. Arbi-
trage is an easy profit of value with no costs or risks from
the perspective of an individual. However, the cost in ar-
Creating Utilities Examples
Types Definition ↑ ↓
Form
created by design / reshape
/ reformulate / assemble of
goods or services
software upgrade, marketing
reshape information
error in upgraded software,
waste
Place
created by making goods
and services easier to obtain
where they needed (deliver-
able)
markets, stores, selling wa-
ter at a mountain peak
Missing stock a store, bank
that can not give a loan
Time
created by making goods
and service easier to obtain
when they needed
fast-food, opening hours of
stores
Absence of emergency med-
ical services
Task,
Knowledge,
Service
created by providing profes-
sional and personal service,
assistance, guidance, etc.
bankers, layers, academic
advisor, ministers, reviews,
doctors, etc.
supplying bad service, false
and non-promoting tips, bu-
reaucracy
Possession created by transfer of owner-ship car dept
Information communication
marketing, teaching, an-
swering questions, naviga-
tion directions etc.
false information
Table 2: Types of utilities and examples for creating positive and negative utility.
bitrage is always paid, in a different dimension. Perception
and awareness of the society to the risks of gaps is critical
for its survival and value preserving. Cost-optimal behavior
with not full value aware judgment function is by default
gaps/traps oriented because free is always better when opti-
mizing cost. When we state that we are action cost-optimal
we should continue and state on the expanse of what. In the
next section, we discuss several aspects to address that ques-
tion.
The Forgotten Aspects of Problem Solving
Most of the approach in the literature for planning, and in
particular the goal-oriented approaches address only par-
tially the real-world complexity. In the real-world scenarios,
almost every plan has additional phases. When an agent that
achieves his goals, sometimes he can stay at the location for
which he planned, but most of the times he should retreat.
Consider the well-known example of the logistic domain
problem, which is addressed in many fields. The problem de-
fined with packages to be delivered to various locations by
various transportation methods as tracks and airplane. The
goal in such domain usually defined by finding the most ef-
ficient (cost optimal) trajectories to match and deliver pack-
ages to pre-defined locations. Under the assumption of this
definition, the problem is solved while the driver of the truck
and the pilot at the location of the target. The retreat phase of
planning is not addressed, which leaves the final phase of the
problem in the hands of the people that defined as predicates
implicitly as part of the truck or plane. If such plan reaches
the industry, it brings damage to many values, human and
financial, due to a limited perception of reality which com-
piled into academic advice for planning.
Suppose the goals are of a high priority and must be
reached at any cost, we must stick to hard goals. A respon-
sible solution for such scenarios should also plan the goal
state and choose a plan to a goal within a state that will be
suitable to retreat or to perform the following activity. If a
goal can be reached from different trajectories, it will be re-
sponsible not to assume that the appearance of an agent in a
state is equal regarding risk and values.
Solving complex systems with a diversity of values goals
and restrictions, assuming a binary judgment function of
achievements in a domain-independent approach consistent
a paradox with many impacts on the user of the suggested
solution. The efficiency that measured with such definition
of achievements is an illusion of a success that obtained by
simplifying complexity. Development of methods that are
not applicable to real-world problems can create academic
value, but we must be aware of the fact that in that case the
utility is lost.
Value Alignment
Retrospective
Most of the papers report only final results, a “snapshot of
the finish line”, In total terms of efficiency of time and search
for solution effort and the number of solved problems. Em-
pirical evaluation based on a “snapshot of the finish line”
missing the entire story of the evaluated problem-solving
method. When we measure complex and time-consuming
solutions we can get much more information from the pro-
cess of problem-solving, the behavior of the algorithm in
different situations of complexity. Understanding why one
problem solved while the other not on the process level
rather than just reporting that. Each experiment can provide
a retrospective on the proposed approach. Attention to mea-
surement engineering of our research will lead to a better
understanding and progress in research.
Relative Estimation of Achievements
This paper suggests rethinking the usage of binary judgment
functions of achievements for the sake of safety and effec-
tiveness. Real-world problems are dynamic, and preferences
depend on circumstances, while a perception of achieve-
ments as hard goals implies absolute preferences of values.
Relative estimation methods are more flexible and realis-
tic, particularly when a domain-independent approach for
problem-solving discussed. The relativity of achievements
and resource allowance must be considered more closely
to scale up to real-world problem solving and domain-
independent approaches.
Problems with limited resources and with a diversity of
achievements are problems of choosing the most desirable
within what available, choose within a budget and from what
is available to choose, being aware to the fact that not all al-
lowed. Achievements in such problems are relative by def-
inition. Relative estimation approaches are the bridge be-
tween sparsity of problem-solving approaches and research
fields to join forces to reduce risk and increase value. Net-
benefit planning (Van Den Briel et al. 2004; Nigenda and
Kambhampati 2005; Baier, Bacchus, and McIlraith 2009;
Bonet and Geffner 2008; Benton, Do, and Kambhampati
2009; Coles and Coles 2011; Keyder and Geffner 2009) is a
relative estimation concerning achievements aware to costs
in the process to achieve.
The nature of landmarks (which discussed in the follow-
ing sections) allow to work in phases like cost preserving,
investment, damage reducing value preserving; it is the nat-
ural bridge for synergistic combination and cooperation of
approaches and researches toward a mutual target.
Globally-Local Perspective
Landmarks and milestones which are facts regarding the
world or things the should be done along the way to a goal.
The bridge for goal- and process-oriented approach is the
reason for the recent success of the action landmarks. Based
on their logical basis, the guidance obtained with action
landmark implementation can be explained as breaking the
search-process to local-goal-directed sub-processes. Local,
as opposed to global optimization, is much more suitable
for real-world problems complexity. What makes the land-
marks to a bridge for goal- and process-oriented approaches
is that the logical basis of action landmarks discovery is an
end-process (goal) oriented. This observation allowed us to
define the end-process oriented approach and leads us to the
following conclusions;
1. A general domain-independent planning should be de-
fined concerning end-process oriented approach (based on
the decision and rational decision-theoretic planning)
2. The key for global optimization is in the optimization of
landmarks discovery mechanism and exploitation with an
objective to refine rationality regarding goal reachability.
A Rational Glimpse into the Future. Analysis of the
problem allows deducing what must happen in each plan.
Landmarks are the only rational information we have regard-
ing the process of the problem. Extraction of a refined set of
landmarks is a glimpse into the future, the allocation of the
budget should be made upon that information. We should
avoid unnecessary actions in case the budget is not sufficient
to avoid waste of resources and effect on the environment.
The first question that should be asked is “can we do it ef-
fectively?”, the answer should be rechecked along the plan.
Fact landmarks are propositions that must be true at
some point in every solution plan for a given planning
task (Hoffmann, Porteous, and Sebastia 2004). s-landmark
is an assignment to a variable that is true at some point in
every plan for a state s.
Action landmarks is an action o taken along every
plan. Disjunctive action landmarks, each corresponding to
a set of operators such that every plan contains at least
one operator from that set (Karpas and Domshlak 2009;
Helmert and Domshlak 2009; Bonet and Helmert 2010;
Pommerening and Helmert 2013).
Value driven landmarks are an interrelated set of ac-
tions which confined to properties of plans that improve over
the utility of a state s in hand (Muller and Karpas 2018).
Treating achievements as landmarks and evaluation of the
achievements in the context of the value that they represent,
allows for a so-called improving approach for decision mak-
ing in complex systems with over-subscribed goals or infor-
mation. Empirical evaluations showed that planning and act-
ing by with a target of self-improvement outperforms state-
of-the-art goal-oriented approaches, namely collecting ap-
proaches. At a high level, an optimal plan consists of two
parts: a prefix which achieves some valuable fact, and a suf-
fix which maintains that valuable achievement, improving
the utility of the other variables. The prefix can be thought
of as “investing” or being “effective”, while the suffix can
be thought of as “reaping the benefits”. Since these land-
marks built to improve relatively instead achieve some goal
or value absolutely, they are independent of the polarity of
the utility value and apply to scenarios of decreasing dam-
age as well as gaining a benefit. The relative estimation con-
cept of value-driven-landmarks as an alternative perception
of goals allows to address numerical and negative utilities.
Cost derived landmarks. We define here a new set of
landmarks that hold the information of time or location that
an agent has to pay for external service. For example, pay
for fuel or toll road. This information is derived from re-
sources and constraints and not handled yet in the context of
landmarks for reachability. Cost derived landmarks deduced
from the cost of value-driven landmarks. First and necessary
condition for an activity is that it leads to a substitutable, or
improved value (effectively), which is represented by value-
driven landmarks. Next, for an effective process only, cost
derived (from effective value) landmark represent what and
how many resources required to make it happen (efficiently).
By analyzing budget and resource in a task that requires
planning, a planner can recognize actions of pure lose if they
are critical to keeping a process alive.
A process of refining and extraction of lengthier land-
marks promise a better performance of AI agents. Land-
marks are the only thing that is rational when an agent plan
his actions.
Rational Decision-Theoretic Planning. Traditional ap-
proaches for deterministic automated action planning, at
its base, assumes rational-deterministic decision making
without defining the bounds of rationality/determinism. We
argue that the term of determinism has to be resource-
bounded, where time and processing capacity are the most
basic bounds. Goals can be set, and planning approach
should be chosen in a resource-bounded manner. Assuming
unbounded-resource in hard problems is the first irrational
decision and starts an irrational process of planning. That
is the main reason that without changing the logical basis
we will never scale-up to the real-world problems solving. It
will be natural to combine the traditional deterministic ap-
proach with the decision-theoretic approaches for planning
with uncertainty.
Landmarks in Decision-Theoretic Planning. Many
decision-theoretic planning frameworks are focused on local
reasoning and do not use landmarks heuristics. We suggest
a dynamic goal as a reference which allows for landmark-
based reasoning. This approach will improve local guidance
based on information gained during the search and improve
the performance of decision-theoretic solvers. Conceptually,
these landmarks are the global guidance of local improve-
ment process.
The Value of Knowledge. Consider the value of knowl-
edge; it is not clear how to evaluate knowledge. The nature
of knowledge is such that can be evaluated in time perspec-
tive. Creating useful knowledge paid with the cost of all
listed components and its value is shared and becomes in
possession of the society, allows for evolution and wealth
and progress. Many of the achievements in science and the
history of ideas got their value only after the creator of the
idea passed away. The other side of unfulfilled value poten-
tial of knowledge is involved crimes of stealing knowledge,
plagiarism. Costs paid in one dimension and value created
in a different dimension, creating. A singularity of discov-
ered observation appears with no costs behind. At the same
time at the dimension of the origin of knowledge, there is
an anomaly, expressed with multi-valued investment with
no results as expected. Plagiarism is a real crime that has
to be measured in a perspective of several dimensions. The
Information Revolution and the increased speed of informa-
tion transfer that came along with the development of the
Internet this problem becomes acute and requires attention.
If individuals in a society cannot trust society when they
make long-term investments like research, long-term invest-
ments oriented with social values will be replaced by, short-
term, cost-optimal investments. Another case of the value of
knowledge is the entrepreneurship process where a group of
individuals take a risk and make the long-term investment to
give life to an idea. Even in a trusted system when the idea
revealed to the market, there is a well-known phenomenon
described as the time to market.
Investment in knowledge. Investigation with an aim to
create a useful and effective knowledge requires invest-
ment and involve risk, the risk of failure. Such investments
should be encouraged. An individual in a trusted society
can take the risk of long-term research if the society sup-
ports him and hedge the risk taken by the individual. Sim-
ilarly to economic investment, a natural hedge of risk for
research can be built on values such as the value of effec-
tive knowledge the value of failure. If society can make
value out of failure, it will lead to a more significant ben-
efit concerning academy goals along with additional ben-
efits on several dimensions. Hedge for a long-term invest-
ment in sustainable values, human values. Long-term in-
vestments are proved to be an excellent strategy to create
an effective value. Applying, long-term investment strategy,
we suggest combining observations from AI problem solv-
ing, planning and search in large-scale domain approaches.
Search in large-scale domains and research are very related
to each other not only by name but also in the concept and
dynamics of making a quick guess on a path within and
to uncertainty. Inspired by these similarities and we sug-
gest another hypothesis to estimate values. The relation of
trust in the community to publishing failures as a key to
collaborative and effective research progress. The branch-
and-bound pruning algorithm considered being effective in
complex over-subscription planning systems (Benton, Do,
and Kambhampati 2009; Bonet, Loerincs, and Geffner 1997;
Domshlak and Mirkis 2015; Muller and Karpas 2018), is in
practice make value of failing by using mistakes to speed up
the progress with the pruning method is applied for branches
that cannot promise a better node in the branch of interest.
Since search and research are similar in many ways, there is
a place to investigate this branch more closely to exploit also
what we know about what is wrong.
Discussion
In these days, with the rapid advance of AI decision-making
systems, the researcher and the developer are the gates to
make or stop the crimes in values. It is a more impor-
tant duty of the developer to analyze the risks of his algo-
rithm than coding or writing grammatically perfect code,
and it is even more important to understand the logic and
explain the user the dangerous of the proposed AI solu-
tions and systems. Recent studies on explainable AI (Fox,
Long, and Magazzeni 2017; Gunning 2017; Borgo, Cash-
more, and Magazzeni 2018; Vigan and Magazzeni 2018;
Doran, Schulz, and Besold 2017; Miller 2017) recognized
the gap and made an important step to bridge it by taking re-
sponsibility for explaining AI decision nature. (Mittelstadt,
Russell, and Wachter 2018) Explaining and collection of
feedback from the environment is an ongoing and infinite
process that should be in the ethics’ basis of a developer and
researcher. It is a responsibility that should be integrated into
any process of creation. When we make assumptions of per-
fect or unharmful outcomes in the development process, it
is by default comes at the expense of the user. The impor-
tance of explaining to AI professionals recently raised (Mit-
telstadt, Russell, and Wachter 2018), showing the impact
and risks of encoded decisions on end-user. Being unfamiliar
with the user makes it easier to cut corner since it is an easy
benefit of time to the developer which even cannot imagine
the subject of his crimes. It will be natural to start the reg-
ulation from the system and lead a change of principles, to
ask a paper to state its utilities and values, which values are
improved and which might be in danger.
It is somehow accepted that a process of writing a paper
is done with its publication, and what published is unpub-
lishable. At the same time, there is no feedback aggregated
over time. A retrospective and responsible maintenance of
ideas must be encouraged. The user must have a place to up-
date feedback from the field. Without maintaining feedback,
the academic system will lose the trust of society. Without
the interest of the society, the research community will solve
non-real-world problems, blinded by many publications, fail
to see that it is a bobble — not a real-world problem.
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